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SUMMARY
Cyprus has been divided since 1974.
Greek Cypriots, nearly 80% of the population,
live in the southern two-thirds of the island.
Turkish Cypriots live in the “Turkish Republic
of Northern Cyprus” (TRNC, recognized only
by Turkey), with about 36,000 Turkish troops
providing security.  United Nations (U.N.)
peacekeeping forces maintain a buffer zone
between the two.  Since the late 1970s, the
U.N., with U.S. support, has promoted negoti-
ations aimed at creating a federal, bicom-
munal, bizonal republic on Cyprus. 
The Secretary General’s April 5, 1992,
“Set of Ideas” was a framework for negotia-
tions for an overall settlement. The Security
Council implied that Turkish Cypriot leader
Rauf Denktash was responsible for its failure.
It then called for confidence-building mea-
sures (CBMs). Both sides accepted CBMs in
principle, but did not agree on the Secretary
General’s proposed method for recording
clarifications.
The prospect of Cyprus’s European
Union accession triggered heightened interna-
tional attention to Cyprus and complicated
settlement efforts.  The U.N. hosted inconclu-
sive talks in July and August 1997. Denktash
demanded that the TRNC be recognized as a
state equal to the Greek-Cypriot side.
 Clerides and Denktash participated in
five rounds of U.N.-mediated proximity (indi-
rect) talks beginning in December 1999. On
November 8, 2000, Secretary General Annan
gave the two leaders his “observations” on
substance and procedure. In reaction,
Denktash withdrew from talks.  He and
Clerides met on Cyprus on December 4, 2001,
and began direct talks on January 16, 2002.
On November 11, Annan submitted a compre-
hensive settlement plan based on Swiss and
Belgian models.  Greek Cypriots and Turkish
Cypriots failed to agree on it at an EU summit
in Copenhagen, December 12-13.  After more
negotiations, Annan announced on March 11,
2003, in The Hague, that his efforts had failed.
Cyprus signed an accession treaty to join the
EU on April 16.  The December 14, 2003,
Turkish Cypriot parliamentary election in
northern Cyprus produced a new government
and a stronger Turkish determination to reach
a settlement. 
The U.N. led Cypriot President
Papadopoulos and Denktash in negotiations
from February 19-March 22, 2004.  They
failed to agree. Talks continued in Switzer-
land, with Greek and Turkish leaders present.
Annan presented a final revised plan on March
31.  In referenda on April 24, 76% of Greek
Cypriot voters rejected the Plan, while 65% of
Turkish Cypriot voters accepted it. Annan
blamed Papadopoulos for the result. Cyprus
joined the EU on May 1, 2004.
Members of Congress have urged the
Administration to be more active, although





U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Laura
Kennedy visited Cyprus on May 5-6.  She called on the (Greek) Cypriot government to give
a “realistic” response to U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan’s request for specific changes
that it seeks in the U.N. plan to reunite the island.  She said that the United States would do
everything possible to support the process, but that the Secretary General would judge
whether conditions are right to resume U.N. mediation.  Kennedy asserted that the United
States would continue to take steps to end the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots and eliminate
the economic inequality between the two sides in order to further efforts for a solution.  She
also visited Turkey, Greece, and Britain to assess the situation.  Cypriot President Tassos
Papadopoulos said that he will not disclose his positions before negotiations and that “when
we enter the talks the next time, we must have a reasonable expectation of success.  For that
to happen, talks have to be prepared very well beforehand, and we are in the process of doing
that.”  He sent Ambassador Tasos Tzionis, Director of the President’s Diplomatic Office, to
the U.N. for consultations on substantive and procedural matters beginning on May 16.
The (Greek) Cypriot government has protested the planned visit by several members of
the House Turkish Study Group to northern Cyprus through the airport at Ercan in early June,
charging that it is aimed at upgrading the status of the Turkish Cypriot “regime.” 
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
The island of Cyprus gained its independence from Great Britain in 1960 and has been
divided since 1974.  The 738,000 Cypriots are 76% of Greek ethnic origin, and 19% of
Turkish ethnic origin.  (Less than 5% of the population is Maronites, Armenians, Roman
Catholic Latins, and others.)  At independence, the Republic’s constitution defined elaborate
power-sharing arrangements.  It required a Greek Cypriot president and a Turkish Cypriot
vice president; each elected by his own community.  The Treaty of Alliance among the
Republic, Greece, and Turkey provided for 950 Greek and 650 Turkish soldiers to help
defend the island.  The two sides aspired to different futures for Cyprus: most Greek Cypriots
favored union (of the entire island) with Greece (enosis), and Turkish Cypriots preferred
partition of the island (taksim) and uniting a Turkish zone with Turkey.
Cyprus’s success as a new republic lasted from 1960-1963.  After President Makarios
proposed constitutional modifications in favor of the majority community in 1963, relations
between the two communities deteriorated, with Turkish Cypriots increasingly consolidating
into enclaves in larger towns.  In 1964, Turkish Cypriots withdrew from most national
institutions and began to administer their own affairs.  Intercommunal violence occurred in
1963-64, and again in 1967.  On both occasions, outside mediation and pressure, including
that by the United States, appeared to prevent Turkey from intervening militarily on behalf
of the Turkish Cypriots.  Since the 1964 crisis, U.N. peacekeeping troops have been a buffer
between the two communities.
In 1974, the military junta in Athens supported a coup against President Makarios,
replacing him with a hardline supporter of enosis.  Turkey, citing the 1960 Treaty of
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Guarantee as a legal basis for its move, sent troops in two separate actions and, by August
25, took control of more than 36% of the island.  The military intervention (often called an
invasion) had many byproducts.  Foremost was the widespread dislocation of the Cypriot
population and related refugee and property problems.  The Athens junta fell, civilian
government was restored in Athens and in Nicosia, Greece withdrew from NATO’s military
command to protest NATO’s failure to prevent Turkey’s action, and Turkey’s civilian
government entered an extended period of instability.  U.S. relations with all parties suffered.
After 1974, Turkish Cypriots emphasized a solution to keep the two communities
separate in two sovereign states or two states in a loose confederation.  In February 1975,
they declared their government the “Turkish Federated State of Cyprus” (TFSC).  In 1983,
Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash declared the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”
(TRNC) — a move considered by some a unilateral declaration of independence.  Only
Turkey has recognized it.  Turkish Cypriots have a constitution and a 50-seat parliament.
Denktash argued that creation of an independent state was a necessary precondition for a
federation with the Greek Cypriots.  He ruled out a merger with Turkey and pledged
cooperation with U.N. settlement efforts.
Past Settlement Efforts 
After 1974, U.N. negotiations focused on reconciling the two sides’ interests and
reestablishing a central government.  They foundered on definitions of goals and ways to
implement a federal solution.  Turkish Cypriots emphasized bizonality and the political
equality of the two communities, preferring two nearly autonomous societies with limited
contact.  Greek Cypriots emphasized the freedoms of movement, property, and settlement
throughout the island.  The two parties also differed on the means of achieving a federation:
Greek Cypriots wanted their internationally recognized national government to devolve
power to the Turkish Cypriots, who would then join a Cypriot republic.  For the Turkish
Cypriots, two entities would join, for the first time, in a new federation.  These views could
affect resolution of property, citizenship of Turkish settlers, and other legal issues.  Since
1974, there have been many rounds of U.N.-sponsored direct and indirect negotiations:
1977 Makarios-Denktash Meeting.  Agreed that 1) Cyprus will be an independent,
nonaligned, bicommunal, federal republic; 2) each administration’s control over territory
will be determined in light of economic viability, productivity, and property rights; 3)
freedom of movement, settlement, and property will be discussed; and 4) powers and
functions of the central federal government would safeguard the unity of the country.
1979 Kyprianou-Denktash Communique.  Agreed to talk on the basis of the 1977
guidelines and address territorial and constitutional issues, giving priority to Varosha,
demilitarization, and to eschew union in whole or part with any other country. 
1984 Proximity Talks.  After the 1983 declaration of the “TRNC,” U.N.
representatives conducted proximity or indirect talks on constitutional arrangements,
withdrawal of foreign troops, and the status of international treaties and guarantees.
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1985-86 U.N. Draft Framework Exercise.  This was an unsuccessful effort in
which the two sides took turns rejecting a draft U.N. document.  Afterwards, the Greek
Cypriots called for an international conference or a new summit to revitalize the process.
1988-89 Talks.  After futile informal direct talks, Cypriot President Vassiliou and
Denktash submitted papers that hardened positions.  In April 1989, Secretary General Perez
de Cuellar discouraged written positions and proposed separate meetings. Denktash criticized
the idea of proximity talks, but the U.N. believed the parties had agreed to “separate and
periodic joint meetings.”  In June, Perez de Cuellar circulated draft ideas for an agreement.
Turkish Cypriots argued that the U.N. had exceeded its good offices role and would accept
only a document drafted by the parties.
March 1990 - April 1992.  Security Council Resolution 649, May 13, 1990,
reaffirmed the Secretary General’s right to make suggestions.  It referred to the federal
solution as bicommunal as regards constitutional aspects and bizonal as regards territorial
aspects — the first U.N. reference to bizonality, a key concept for the Turkish Cypriots.  In
June 1991, Perez de Cuellar called for an international meeting.  On August 2, President
Bush announced that Greece and Turkey had agreed to a U.N. conference on Cyprus.  The
Secretary General insisted that the sides be within range of agreement first, but the Greek and
Turkish Prime Ministers were unable to find common ground.  On October 8, de Cuellar
reported that a conference was not possible and blamed Denktash’s assertion that each side
possessed sovereignty, which U.N. resolutions attribute solely to the Republic. 
Set of Ideas.  Secretary General Boutros-Ghali’s April 1992 report suggested a
bizonal federation of two politically equal communities, possessing one international
personality and sovereignty.  A bicameral legislature would have a 70:30 ratio of Greek
Cypriots to Turkish Cypriots in the lower house and a 50:50 ratio in the upper house.  7:3
ratio would prevail in the federal executive.  Each state would be guaranteed a majority of
the population and of land in its area.  Non-Cypriot forces not foreseen in the 1960 Treaty
of Alliance would withdraw.  In June, Boutros-Ghali presented a “non-map.”  A new U.N.
draft provided for separate referenda in each community within 30 days of an agreement, an
18-month transitional period, withdrawal of Turkish troops, guarantees consistent with
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe principles, an end of the Greek Cypriot
embargo, free movement, a time-table for the return of Greek Cypriot refugees and their
property, three constitutions (one for each community and one for the central government),
a 7:3 ratio in the executive, vice-presidential veto power (no rotating presidency), an
island-wide referendum on EC membership, and the return of Varosha and about 30 villages
to Greek Cypriots.  Turkish Cypriots would receive assistance and compensation.  Greek
Cypriots would get Morphou.  Denktash said that Turkish Cypriots to be displaced would
total 40,000 or about one-quarter of the north’s population.  Vassiliou estimated that 82,000
Greek Cypriots would be able to return home and that Denktash’s 40,000 figure was inflated.
On August 21, Boutros-Ghali said that Denktash’s territorial proposals were not close
to the “non-map” and described Vassiliou as ready to negotiate an agreement based on the
map.  Boutros-Ghali concluded that an accord was possible if Turkish Cypriots foresaw
territorial adjustment in line with his map.  Denktash said this was unacceptable.  S/Res/774,
August 26, 1992, endorsed the set of ideas and non-map.  The Secretary General’s November
19  report implied Denktash’s responsibility for the lack of progress.  On February 14, 1993,
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Glafcos Clerides, who accepted the set of ideas only “in principle,” was elected president of
Cyprus.
Confidence-Building Measures.  On November 19, 1992, the Secretary General
called for confidence-building measures (CBMs) including a reduction of Turkish troops in
exchange for a reduction in defense spending by the Republic of Cyprus; U.N. control of
Varosha; contacts between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots; reduced restrictions on
foreign visitors crossing the buffer zone; bicommunal projects; a U.N.-supervised
island-wide census; cooperation in U.N. feasibility studies on resettlement and rehabilitation
of people who would be affected by territorial adjustments.
From May 24 to June 1, 1993, Clerides and Denktash discussed opening Varosha and
reopening Nicosia Airport, which has been under U.N. control but unused since 1974.
Clerides insisted that all of Varosha be handed over, while Denktash balked at the idea and
claimed that CBMs would benefit Greek Cypriots more than Turkish Cypriots.  However,
U.N. experts determined that both sides would benefit, with relatively greater benefits for
Turkish Cypriots because of their smaller economy and lifting of obstacles facing them.
Greek Cypriots sought to avoid recognizing the TRNC. 
On January 28, 1994, Denktash agreed to CBMs in principle.  He later argued that a
March 21 U.N. draft unbalanced equities in the CBMs.  Clerides said that he would accept
the March 21 text if Denktash would.  The Secretary General’s May 30 report, made known
on June 1, insisted that the March draft had not destroyed balance.  Boutros-Ghali blamed
the Turkish Cypriots’ lack of political will for the lack of agreement.  On May 31, Denktash
had said that he would accept the CBMs if improvements agreed to were incorporated.
Clerides would not negotiate beyond the March document.  Boutros-Ghali’s June 28 letter
to the Security Council President concluded that there was sufficient progress to implement
CBMs based on the March paper and clarifications, and said that he intended to address an
identical letter to each leader expressing his intention to proceed and request the Security
Council to endorse the March 21 paper.  Neither side accepted this procedure.
Developments, 1997-2001. On January 4, 1997, Cyprus contracted to purchase
Russian S-300 (SA-10) anti-aircraft missiles with a 90-mile range able to reach southern
Turkey to protect air and naval bases in southern Cyprus to be used by Greece.  The U.S.
State Department criticized the decision.  Turkish officials said that they would not allow the
weapons to be deployed.  The State Department responded that a threat to use force was
unacceptable. On January 20, Turkish President Suleyman Demirel and Denktash signed a
joint defense declaration, stating that any attack on the TRNC would be an attack on Turkey.
Secretary General Annan called for indirect talks followed by open-ended, direct talks
between Clerides and Denktash.  As goodwill gestures, Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots
exchanged visits to holy sites and held bicommunal events and meetings.  Greek planes did
not overfly Cyprus during joint Greek-Greek Cypriot military exercises in May and for the
next five months.  Turkish planes did not overfly Cyprus for the same time. 
Clerides and Denktash met under U.N. auspices at Troutbeck, New York, July 9-12, and
in Switzerland, August 11-15.  Beforehand, Denktash said that he would not sign documents
until the European Union (EU) suspended its accession negotiations with the (Greek) Cypriot
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government as the sole representative of Cyprus. (See European Union, below.)  He refused
to sign a joint declaration at the end of the talks. 
Greece and Turkey ended their moratoria on military flights in October.  During military
exercises, their warplanes confronted each other over Cyprus, but neither side fired.  Greece
charged that Turkish planes had harassed its defense minister’s  plane.  In October, Turkey
conducted exercises in northern Cyprus, including the mock destruction of missile launchers.
After the December 12, 1997,  EU formal decision to begin accession talks with Cyprus,
Denktash informed the U.N. that “intercommunal talks have ended,” and  that he would only
participate in talks between states having equal status. The TRNC suspended all bicommunal
activities except religious pilgrimages. 
The military air base at Paphos became operational for use by Greek fighter planes on
January 24, 1998.  The S-300 missiles were intended to protect the base. The Cypriot
government said that if there were either a demilitarization agreement or substantial progress
toward a settlement, then it would not deploy the S-300s.
On April 23, Denktash and Demirel called for negotiations only between sovereign,
equal states.  They said that the special relationship between Turkey and the TRNC would
be enhanced in every field. 
In June, Greece sent six planes to Paphos air base, and Turkey responded by sending
six planes to northern Cyprus.  Cypriot troops completed S-300 training in Russia in July
with a test-firing.  Secretary of State Albright reportedly asked Clerides to reconsider the S-
300 purchase, to store the missiles outside of Cyprus, or to order shorter range SA-15s
instead.  On December 29, Clerides decided not to deploy the missiles after the EU, United
States, Britain, and the U.N. had provided an acceptable political context for his decision.
On June 20, 1999, the G-8 summit of leaders of major industrialized countries and
Russia urged the Secretary General to invite the Cypriot leaders to negotiate without
preconditions.  Annan declared his readiness to do so.  On June 29, the Security Council
called upon the two leaders to support a comprehensive negotiation with no preconditions,
all issues on the table, and to negotiate in good faith until a settlement is reached, with full
consideration of all U.N. resolutions and treaties.  Another resolution said that the goal is a
Cyprus with a single sovereignty that comprises two politically equal communities in a
bicommunal, bizonal federation.  During the annual Greek-Greek Cypriot military exercise
in October, no Greek planes landed at the Paphos; there were no incidents involving Greek
and Turkish planes; and Turkey’s objections to the exercise were milder than in prior years.
Proximity Talks.  Annan and his Special Advisor, Peruvian diplomat Alvaro de Soto,
began proximity talks with Clerides and Denktash in December.  S/Res/1283, December 15,
1999, reaffirmed “all its relevant resolutions on Cyprus,” without specifying a bizonal,
bicommunal federation with a single sovereignty as its goal. Annan’s addendum noted “The
Government of Turkey has indicated that it concurs with ... the position of the Turkish
Cypriot party, namely that UNFICYP can operate on both sides of the island only on the
basis of the consent of both parties and that the Turkish Cypriot authorities will ... request
UNFICYP to work with them....” The Turkish Cypriots interpreted the wording as a move
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toward recognition of their state, and the Greek Cypriots were upset with the Turkish Cypriot
view.  A second round of proximity talks was held January 31-February 8, 2000. 
The Cypriot and Greek governments prevented an addendum similar to that of
December 1999 in S/Res/ 1303, June 15, 2000.  Denktash then linked his attendance at talks
to measures that would prove that UNFICYP needs Turkish Cypriot cooperation.  Turkish
forces set up a three-man checkpoint outside Strovilia, a small Greek Cypriot village in the
no-man’s land separating the Turkish Cypriot-administered area and a British base, where
UNFICYP forces cross between north and south, blocking UNFICYP access. 
A third round of talks was held from July 24 to August 4.  At the outset of a fourth
round, September 12 to 26, Annan said that he had concluded that the equal status of the
parties “must and should be recognized” explicitly in a comprehensive settlement. Denktash
was pleased.  Clerides boycotted the talks in protest until assured that they would take into
account U.N. resolutions that call for a federal solution. 
During Greek-Greek Cypriot military exercises in October, Greek and Turkish planes
engaged in mock dogfights.  Greek planes landed at Paphos air base, and (Greek) Cypriot
National Guard anti-aircraft missiles deployed at Paphos locked onto Turkish fighter planes.
Turkish planes landed on the island during Turkish-Turkish Cypriot exercises in November.
A fifth round of talks was held from November 1 to 10.  On November 8, Annan gave
his “assessment.”  Media leaks and statements by the parties suggest that he called for one
sovereign, indissoluble, common state with a single international legal personality; common
state law would overrule regional law; political equality would be defined as effective
“participation” in government, not numerically; component states would be to a great extent
self-governed; the return of an “appreciable amount of territory” to Greek Cypriots, with as
little dislocation of Turkish Cypriots as possible and return of as many Greek Cypriots as
possible; and a security regime including an international military force, police, and a
political mechanism.  Clerides welcomed these views.  Denktash rejected them and, at a
November 24 “summit” with Turkey’s President, Prime Minister, Chief of the Armed Forces
General Staff, and other high officials,  announced his withdrawal from the talks because no
progress could be made until two separate states were recognized.  Turkey supported his
decision. Denktash refused to participate in a sixth round of talks in January 2001, labeling
the Secretary General’s assessment an unacceptable precondition.
On September 5, 2001, de Soto said that Annan had invited the two leaders to meet with
him separately on September 12. Clerides accepted.  Denktash did not because, “The
necessary foundation has not been established.”  Denktash proposed a secret face-to-face
meeting with Clerides and, although de Soto did not think it was a good idea, Clerides and
Denktash met on December 4 for the first time since August 1997.  The two leaders agreed
to begin direct talks with no preconditions, all issues on the table, and to continue until a
comprehensive settlement is achieved.  Clerides became the first Cypriot president to travel
to the north since 1974 on December 5, when he attended a dinner at Denktash’s residence.
Denktash reciprocated by visiting Clerides’s private home for dinner on December 29.
Developments, 2002-2003.  On January 16, 2002, Clerides and Denktash agreed to
hold intensive peace talks beginning January 21 at the Nicosia airport, a U.N. base.  Ground
rules provided that there would be no final agreement until all issues were agreed upon.
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On April 29, Denktash proposed a Partnership State to be founded by the two now-
existing states on Cyprus.  On September 6, Annan noted that “though serious differences
remain, the elements of a comprehensive settlement ... exist,” and “that the gaps dividing the
parties can be bridged.”  Clerides observed, however, that there appeared to be no way of
approaching sovereignty and whether there would be a new state or a continuation of the
Republic of Cyprus.  On September 16, Denktash proposed Belgium as a model for foreign
affairs and Switzerland as a model for domestic affairs.  In October, Clerides and Denktash
agreed to establish committees to deal with international treaties and legislation for the
common state.  Denktash underwent open-heart surgery on October 7. 
November 11, 2002, Annan Plan. Basis for Agreement on a Comprehensive
Settlement of the Cyprus Problem called for a “new state of affairs,” in which the “common
state” government’s relations with its two politically equal component states would be
modeled on the Swiss federal example. It would have a single international legal personality.
Component states would participate in formulating and implementing policy on foreign and
EU relations as in Belgium. Parliament would have two 48-seat houses. Each state would
have equal representation in the Senate. Seats in the Chamber of Deputies would be allocated
in proportion to population, provided that no state would have less than 25% of the seats.
A Presidential Council would have 6 members; the offices of President and Vice President
would rotate every 10 months among its members.  No more than two consecutive presidents
could come from the same state.  Greek and Turkish troops could not exceed a four-digit
figure (9,999).  U.N. peacekeepers would remain as long as the common state, with the
concurrence of the component states, decides.  Cyprus would be demilitarized.  A Supreme
Court would have three Greek Cypriot, three Turkish Cypriot, and three non-Cypriot judges.
During a three-year transition, the leaders of the two sides would be co-presidents. The 1960
Treaties of Establishment, Guarantee, and Alliance would remain in force.  There would be
a single Cypriot citizenship and citizenship of a component state; residence in a component
state could be limited by citizenship, but such limits would have restrictions.  There would
be provisions for return or compensation of property.  Turkish Cypriot territory would be
reduced to 28.5% of the island. 
Clerides and Denktash submitted comments.  Greek Cypriot concerns included power-
sharing, the length of the transition period, insufficient Greek Cypriot repatriation, and the
large Turkish settler population.  Turkish Cypriots criticized sovereignty provisions,  the loss
of water resources and  territory, which would make many Turkish Cypriots refugees, and
the return of Greek Cypriot refugees. On December 10, Annan presented a revised plan.
Changes reduced the number of foreign troops and settlers allowed to remain, increased the
number of Greek Cypriot refugees allowed to return, but reduced the numbers moving into
Turkish Cypriot territory.  He asked both sides to be in Copenhagen during an EU summit.
Clerides and his National Council were there, but Denktash went to Ankara for medical care
and sent his “foreign minister.” Annan had wanted a Founding Agreement signed by
December 12, but it was not.   
Large Turkish Cypriot demonstrations in favor of EU membership for a reunified island,
a settlement based on the U.N. plan, and Denktash’s resignation occurred between November
2002 and February 2003.  On January 2, 2003, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Chairman of the
ruling party in Turkey, stressed the need to heed the wishes of the people and declared,  “I’m
not in favor of the continuation of the policy that has been maintained on Cyprus over the
past 30 to 40 years....”  Denktash and Clerides held talks from January 15 until mid-February.
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On February 21, Greece and Turkey began talks on security. Annan presented his third
revised plan on February 26.  It included a British offer to transfer 45 square miles or almost
half of its sovereign base areas on the island: 90% to the Greek Cypriots and 10% to the
Turkish Cypriots, if the two sides agreed to the Plan.  The revisions allowed Turkish Cypriots
to retain the Karpass Peninsula, with Greek Cypriots settling there as well.  Turkish Cypriot
territory would decrease to 28.2%, and the number of Greek Cypriots returning north would
increase to 92,000, but be capped at 21% of the population of the region at the end of 15
years, and the number of Turkish settlers allowed to remain on the island would increase.
Annan requested that Denktash and the newly elected President of Cyprus Tassos
Papadopoulos permit separate, simultaneous referenda on the Plan on March 30.
On March 10, Annan met Papadopoulos and Denktash in The Hague.  The next day,
Annan announced that his efforts had been unsuccessful.  Papadopoulos wished to be sure
that gaps in federal legislation and constituent state constitutions would be filled, that Greece
and Turkey would commit to security provisions, and that there was time for a campaign on
the referendum.  He was prepared not to reopen substantive provisions if Denktash did the
same.  Denktash objected to basic points of the Plan, would not put it to a referendum, and
argued that negotiations should begin anew.  Annan suggested that negotiations continue
until March 28 and that referenda be held on April 6.  This did not sway the parties.  Annan
announced that it was not possible to achieve a settlement before Cyprus signed the EU
accession treaty on April 16.  Annan’s April 1 report,  said that Denktash “bears prime
responsibility” for the failure, a conclusion echoed by S/Res/1575, April 14, 2003.
On April 2, Denktash offered confidence-building measures and said that he was willing
to discuss how a settlement related to EU membership. On April 18, Annan stated the Plan
could be amended, but it “must be accepted as a basis for negotiating first.” On April 23, the
Turkish Cypriot administration opened border checkpoints. The Cypriot government declared
the decision illegal, but facilitated free movement.  Residents have since made several
million crossings without incident.  On April 30, the Cypriot government announced
measures for Turkish Cypriots, facilitating the movement of goods, persons, and vehicles and
employment of Turkish Cypriots in the south, but implementation was slow due to legal
obstacles.  Later Turkish Cypriot goodwill measures included scholarships, improved
telephone communication, and trade.  
Papadopoulos said that he was ready to negotiate based on the U.N. Plan, which should
be improved and amended to take into account the Treaty of Accession to the EU and to
create a more viable and workable solution.  Denktash stated “there is nothing to discuss.”
In his November 12 report, Annan reiterated that “no purpose would be served” in
renewing his mission of good offices unless both Cypriot parties as well as Greece and
Turkey were ready to finalize negotiations on the basis of his February 2003 Plan and to put
the results to referenda shortly thereafter.  On November 20, Papadopoulos said that he
would not have signed the Annan Plan in March even if Denktash had done so.
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2004 Referenda and After
On January 12, 2004, Denktash admitted, “The Annan Plan is still on the table, we will
sit and discuss it....”  On January 23, the Turkish National Security Council reiterated its
political determination to reach a solution through negotiations with the Annan Plan as a
reference.  On January 24, Erdogan told Annan that Turkey wanted talks to resume with his
Plan as a reference, with the goal of reaching an agreement and holding referenda before May
1 (when Cyprus was scheduled to join the EU).  Erdogan said that if the two sides could not
fill in all the “blanks,” then Turkey would allow Annan to fill them in if the Greek Cypriots
accept that as well. 
Following talks with Annan in New York, February 10-13, Papadopoulos and  Denktash
agreed to resume negotiations on February 19 on Cyprus.  They failed to agree on revising
Annan’s Plan in talks held until March 22.  Technical committees on legislation, treaties,
financial and economic issues, and matters such as the flag and anthem met simultaneously.
On March 17, Denktash said that he would not attend follow-on talks in Burgenstock,
Switzerland (near Lucerne) beginning on March 24, and later declared that he would
campaign against an accord.  Prime Minister Mehmet Ali Talat represented northern Cyprus.
The Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers arrived on March 28 and 29, respectively.  On
March 29, Annan presented a revised Plan.  Revisions called for executive power to be
exercised by a Presidential Council with six voting members and additional non-voting
members to be decided by Parliament.  The offices of President and Vice President would
rotate every 20 months. Greek Cypriots returning north limited to 18% of the population
there; a  reduction of Turkish military forces to 6,000 over 42 months, and further reductions
in subsequent years; when Turkey joins the EU, the number falls to 650 Turkish troops and
950 Greek troops; one Central Bank and the Cyprus pound as currency until the euro is
introduced. Greek Cypriots would have more property returned. Derogations to (exemptions
from) EU law would be in place until the gross domestic product per capita in the north
reaches 85% of the south.  Annan announced on March 31 that the Plan would be put to
referenda on the island on April 24.  (For the final Plan, see [http://www.annanplan.org/].)
On April 7, Papadopoulos rejected the Plan, he said, due to uncertainty about
ratification by the Turkish parliament; immediate benefits for Turkish Cypriots (i.e.,  the end
of the Republic of Cyprus and creation of a United Republic of Cyprus), while the Greek
Cypriots would only gain in the future; restrictions on Greek Cypriot acquisition of property
and on return of refugees, and the denial of political rights of returnees; even a small number
of Turkish troops and increased Turkish guarantor rights created conditions of insecurity for
Greek Cypriots; doubtful economic viability of the Plan, which would harm the Greek
Cypriot standard of living; the Plan would not reunite Cyprus because there would be two
states living separately and decision-making procedures could create “paralyzing impasses;”
prospects for a solution would be better after Cyprus’s accession to the EU because of
Turkey’s aspirations to become an EU member.  The U.N., EU, and United States criticized
the Cyprus government’s distortion of and  propaganda campaign against the Plan, which fed
the Greek Cypriots’ sense of insecurity, and objected to government restrictions on
broadcasting views favoring the Plan.  The powerful Greek Cypriot (Communist) Reformist
Party of Working People (AKEL) called for postponing the referendum for more negotiations
and for implementation to be guaranteed; then it said “no.” Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis
half-heartedly endorsed the Plan, saying that positive elements outweighed “difficulties.”
Denktash rejected the Plan, while Prime Minister Talat called for a “yes” vote.  Serdar
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Denktash, his coalition partner, called for  postponement; his party freed its members to vote
their consciences and Serdar voted “no.”  The Turkish government supported the Plan. 
The United States and Britain tried to address the guarantee issue with a  U.N. Security
Council Resolution to replace UNFICYP with a U.N. Settlement Implementation Mission
in Cyprus (UNSIMIC), and other measures.  On April 21, Russia vetoed the draft, saying
that, while it supported Annan’s efforts, the Council should not act before the referenda and
that the draft should have been discussed more.  (Greek) Cypriot Foreign Minister Iakovou
had previously visited Russia to explain his government’s opposition to the Annan Plan. 
In referenda held on April 24, 76% of Greek Cypriot voters rejected Annan’s Plan,
while 65% of Turkish Cypriot voters accepted it.  Afterwards, Talat urged the international
community to end northern Cyprus’s isolation by lifting restrictions on trade, travel, sports,
and flights in order for it to develop economically.  He said that he would not seek
international recognition of the TRNC because Turkish Cypriots voted for and want
reunification of the island.  He also said that the Plan should not be renegotiated.
Papadopoulos ruled out a second referendum unless negotiations produced improvements
to the Plan.  (Greek) Cypriot officials argued that direct flights and exports from the north
would not contribute to reunification and that it was the sovereign right of the Republic of
Cyprus to determine legal ports of entry for persons, capital, and goods.
In his May 28, 2004 Report, S/2004/437, Annan described developments leading up to
the April 24 referenda.  He said that the Greek Cypriots’ vote must be respected, but they
need to demonstrate their willingness to resolve the Cyprus problem through a bicommunal,
bizonal federation and to articulate their concerns about security and implementation of the
plan with “clarity and finality.” As a contribution to reunification, he called for the
elimination of restrictions that have the effect of isolating the Turkish Cypriots.  He
concluded, “A solution ... also needs bold and determined political leadership on both sides
of the island, as well as in Greece and Turkey, all in place at the same time, ready to
negotiate with determination and to convince their people of the need to compromise.”  He
criticized Papadopoulos in particular. (For the Report, see  [http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/
sgrep04.html].)  On June 7, Papadopoulos wrote a 20-page letter to Annan about
“inaccuracies” in his Report, including a detailed annex of rebuttals. (For the letter, see
[http://www.antibaro.gr/national/papadopoulos_to_anan.php].)  On June 17, Annan said that
he took a different view on issues and stood fully by the Report.
In his September 24, 2004 Report, S/2004/756, Annan stated that he still saw no basis
for resuming his good offices mission.  He said that contacts between the Greek Cypriot and
Turkish Cypriot leaders had ceased and signs of mutual distrust had reappeared since the
referenda.  Annan noted that he did not intend to appoint a new Special Advisor on Cyprus
(to replace de Soto, who was reassigned). The Chief of Mission of UNFICYP (Zbigniew
Wlosowicz) acts as Annan’s Special Representative, and senior officials of the Secretariat
might deal on an ad hoc basis with issues that might require special attention.  On February
10, 2005, Annan observed that the Turkish side, particularly Erdogan, had indicated a
possible readiness to resume talks.  Annan urged Papadopoulos to put on paper the changes
that he would want to have in the settlement plan, saying “a detailed list of his objections
would help.”  The Cypriot government spokesman said that it would not present its




When the Greek Cypriot side gives in writing and in detail the changes it wants to a U.N.
settlement plan, then the U.N. Secretary General will decide if ... ‘we are proving our
political will for a settlement.’ This means that he will have the right alone, as a mediator,
to judge and decide if what we are asking for is reasonable, if it provides the basis for the
resumption of his initiative.... We will not accept another mediating role of the U.N.
Secretary General.  The national issues ... can be neither solved through the mediation of
a foreigner nor even with preventative mediation.
Yet, he added that the Greek Cypriot side wants a new U.N. initiative. 
Other Factors Affecting the Talks
Domestic Politics in Cyprus
 On February 16, 2003, Tassos Papadopoulos was elected president of Cyprus as the
candidate of his right-wing Democratic Party (DIKO), the Reformist Party of Working
People (AKEL/Eurocommunist party), the Social Democratic Movement (KISOS), and the
Greens. (Papadopoulos is a controversial nationalist whose law firm represented Serbian
enterprises and allegedly helped them establish front companies on Cyprus to violate U.N.
sanctions on the former Yugoslavia.  He was on the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control
list of “blocked persons” until 1995, when sanctions were lifted.) On May 28, 2001,
parliamentary elections had produced a narrow victory for AKEL, which received 34.71%
of the vote and 20 seats in the 50-seat parliament.  Democratic Rally ( DISI) took second
place with 34% of the vote and 19 seats.  DIKO won 14.84% of the vote and 9 seats; KISOS,
with 6.51% of the vote, holds 4 seats.  Four other parties also won seats.  AKEL leader
Dimitris Christofias is speaker of parliament, acting for the president when he is absent or
incapacitated.  There is no vice president because the 1960 Constitution reserves the post for
a Turkish Cypriot. 
Rauf Denktash led northern Cyprus from 1975 until April 17, 2005.  He did not run for
re-election. The December 14, 2003, parliamentary election produced a tie between
supporters and opponents of the Annan Plan.  A coalition of the Republican Turkish Party
(CTP) and the Peace and Democracy Movement (BDH) had hoped to oust Denktash as
negotiator and achieve a solution based on the Annan Plan by May 2004. CTP, led by
Mehmet Ali Talat, won 35.18% of the votes and 19 seats, while BDH secured 13.14% and
6 seats.  The National Unity Party (UBP) got 32.93% of the votes and 18 seats, and the
Democrat Party (DP) won 12.79% of the votes and 7 seats. Three parties failed to pass the
5% threshold to enter parliament.  Talat became Prime Minister and Serdar Denktash of the
DP, Rauf’s son, became Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister in a coalition
government.  After several members resigned, the government was reduced to a minority and
could not legislate. On October 21, 2004, it resigned, and a new government could not be
formed.  Early parliamentary elections were held on February 20, 2005.   With an 80% voter
turnout, the CTP increased its vote share to 44.45%  and seats to 24, while UBP won 31.71%
and 19 seats, DP won 13.49%  and 6 seats, and BDH’s showing fell to 5.81% and 1seat.
Talat and Denktash formed a new coalition.  On April 17, Talat was elected “President” of
the TRNC with 55.6% of the vote to 22.7% for Dervis Eroglu, his nearest rival in a field of
nine candidates. Ferdi Sabit Soyer of the CTP is the new prime minister.
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Policies of Greece and Turkey
The “motherlands,” Greece and Turkey,  defend and protect their ethnic kin, and their
bilateral relations, strained over Aegean Sea issues, have been harmed because of Cyprus.
On November 16, 1993, Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou and Clerides agreed
to a joint defense doctrine whereby their governments would decide on the Cyprus issue
jointly, Greece would include Cyprus in its defense plan, and any Turkish advance would
lead to war between Greece and Turkey.  Clerides announced in April 1994 that Greece
would provide air cover for Cyprus, while Cypriot bases would refuel Greek Air Force
planes, a naval base would be set up, and elite troops would bolster land forces.
Papandreou’s successors retained the doctrine.
Turkish governments had argued that the Cyprus problem was not acute because
Turkish Cypriot security had been ensured since 1974, and that dialogue was the appropriate
channel for resolution. Turks agreed that their armed forces should not withdraw until
Turkish Cypriots’ rights were guaranteed effectively.  In a policy shift, the current Justice and
Development Party (AKP) government maintains that no solution is not a solution.  In 2005,
Turkey will provide $356.9 million in aid and loans to the TRNC. 
In July 1999, Greece and Turkey began a dialogue on  “lesser” issues, excluding Cyprus
and the Aegean, that has led to many bilateral accords.  Greece’s decision to allow the EU
to affirm Turkey’s membership candidacy that December confirmed a rapprochement.  The
two governments have since engaged in protracted exploratory talks on Aegean issues.  On
November 2, 2000, Foreign Minister George Papandreou asserted that the solution of the
Cyprus problem is the most basic precondition for a full bilateral rapprochement.  After the
April 24, 2004-referenda, however, Greek Prime Minister Costas Karamanlis said that a
resolution of the Cyprus issue should not be a precondition for Turkey’s bid to join the EU
or for improving Greek-Turkish relations.
European Union
A customs agreement between Cyprus and the European Community (EC) came into
force in 1988.  On July 4, 1990, Cyprus applied for EC membership.  Turkish Cypriots
objected because, by accepting the application, the EC recognized the Republic’s government
and not their own. Greece’s EC membership and Turkey’s lack thereof led Turks and Turkish
Cypriots to view increased EC/EU involvement as favoring Greek Cypriots.
The EU was to set a date for Cyprus’s accession negotiations in January 1995.  The EU
preferred a prior settlement, but was willing to begin negotiations without one.  In December
1994, Greece had vetoed an EU-Turkey customs union and some Europeans demanded that
the veto be lifted before addressing Cyprus’s application. On March 6, 1995, the EU
separately ratified the customs union accord and scheduled accession talks with Cyprus.  At
Greece’s insistence, the Republic was the EU’s interlocutor. Turkey said that if Greek
Cypriots were admitted into the EU as the Cyprus government, then Turkey would integrate
with the “TRNC” to the same degree.  Denktash asserted that if Cyprus became an EU
member while Turkey was not a member, then it would weaken Turkey’s security guarantees
and create a surrogate union between Greece and Cyprus.  
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On July 10, 1997, the European Commission reconfirmed that membership talks with
Cyprus would open in 1998.  On July 20, then Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Ecevit and
Denktash issued a joint declaration, noting the July 10 statement and calling for a process of
partial integration between Turkey and TRNC to parallel that of Cyprus and the EU.
Denktash ended contacts with the EU because they “legitimize” an accession process
initiated “illegally” by the Greek Cypriots. 
On several occasions, Greek Deputy Foreign Minister Papandreou said that Greece
would block the EU’s expansion eastward if Cyprus were not accepted because it is divided.
On November 10, the EU began accession negotiations with Cyprus. On May 14, 1999, then
Greek Alternate Foreign Minister Kranidiotis declared, “It is clear that Cyprus can become
a member of the EU even if the Cyprus problem is not solved....  “  On July 10, he said that
Greece would not object to Turkey’s EU membership candidacy if assured that Cyprus’s
accession would go ahead even without a solution.  Turkey rejected linkage between the
Cyprus issue and its candidacy.  The EU Helsinki summit’s conclusions on December 10,
1999, said, “If no settlement has been achieved by  the completion of accession negotiations,
the ... decision on accession will be made without the above (i.e., a settlement) being a
precondition.  In this the Council will take account of all relevant factors.”  The summit also
affirmed Turkey’s EU candidacy. 
In December 2002, the EU concluded accession talks with Cyprus.  At the same time,
the EU and NATO agreed on EU use of NATO assets, stipulating that Cyprus will not take
part in EU military operations conducted using NATO assets once it becomes an EU member
because it is not a member of NATO nor of NATO’s Partnership for Peace.   Since Cyprus
became an EU member in 2004, however, the EU has said that it could not restrict Cyprus’s
participation in cooperation with NATO.  Yet, Turkey has insisted on the 2002 accord and
vetoed Cyprus’s participation, impeding EU-NATO military cooperation.
Cyprus signed the Treaty of Accession to the EU on April 16, 2003, to become an EU
member on May 1, 2004, An attached Protocol suspends the application of the acquis
communautaire (EU rules and legislation) to those areas “in which the government of the
Republic of Cyprus does not exercise effective control.” On July 14, the (Greek) Cypriot
parliament ratified the Treaty on behalf of the entire island.
On June 3, the European Commission had proposed goodwill measures to bring
northern Cyprus closer to the EU, including 12 million euros (US$14 million) in aid.  It
proposed that the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce issue certificates for the movement
of goods between Cyprus and the EU (to circumvent the de facto EU embargo on Turkish
Cypriot goods that began with a 1994 ruling that movement certificates issued by Turkish
Cypriot authorities were not valid).  The (Greek) Cypriot government authorized the
Chamber to issue certificates of origin, but said that exports required further certification to
ensure that EU specifications were met and could be made only through legal (southern)
ports of the Republic.  Denktash accepted the financial aid, but rejected the trade measures,
which meant accepting the Greek Cypriot government as the entire island’s government. 
On November 5, the Commission’s annual report on Turkey’s progress toward
accession warned that “absence of a settlement on Cyprus could become a serious obstacle
to Turkey’s EU aspirations, “ while the December 12 European Council (summit) declaration
said that “a settlement would greatly facilitate Turkey’s membership aspirations.”
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The Commission regretted the Greek Cypriots’ rejection of the Annan Plan and
congratulated the Turkish Cypriots for their “yes” vote in the April 24, 2004, referenda.  EU
foreign ministers said that they were “determined to put an end to the isolation of the Turkish
Cypriot community and facilitate the reunification of Cyprus by encouraging the economic
development of the Turkish Cypriot community.”  They called on the Commission to submit
proposals. “Green Line Regulations,” adopted on April 29 and effective on August 23,
require Greek Cypriot authorities to end restrictions on EU citizens’ travel between the two
parts of the island and allow Turkish Cypriots to export more products through the south.
On May 1, Cyprus joined the EU.  EU laws and regulations are suspended in the north. 
On July 7, the Commission proposed measures to end the Turkish Cypriots’ isolation
and to help eliminate the economic disparities between the two communities on the island.
They include 259 million euros (U.S.$318 million) in aid for 2004-2006 and preferences
to allow direct trade between northern Cyprus and EU countries.  Neither step has been
implemented.  The Cypriot government agrees with granting aid to the north, but demands
that the office administering the funds operate out of the south.  It rejects the trade measure
as illegal because it is based on a provision for providing preferential treatment for third
parties and, thereby, it argues, would allow the TRNC to acquire characteristics of state short
of international recognition.  The Greek Cypriots also say that the measure is not needed
because of the Green Line Regulations.  They insist that all trade between the north and
Europe be conducted via the south.  On February 3, 2005, the Cypriot government agreed to
expand the list of goods and the value of personal belongings allowed to move freely across
the Green Line in order to get the north to make use of the Regulations.  The Turkish
Cypriots view the EU aid and trade proposals as indivisible, arguing that aid without trade
would not grow their economy, and that required use of southern ports would force the
northern economy south and make it smaller over time.  Moreover, they decry the limits the
Greek Cypriots have forced the EU to impose on how aid would be used.
On December 17, the EU decided to begin accession talks with Turkey on October 3,
2005.  It “welcomed Turkey’s decision to sign the Protocol regarding the adaptation of the
Ankara Agreement (customs union), taking into account the accession of ten new Member
States” (which include Cyprus) “prior to the actual start of accession negotiations.”
U.N. Peacekeeping Forces
The United Nations has had forces on Cyprus since 1964.  The size of UNFICYP (U.N.
Forces in Cyprus) is 1,224 troops and 44 civilian police, from 18 countries.  In his September
24, 2004, Report to the Security Council on UNFICYP, the Secretary General proposed to
reduce the strength of the force by about 30% to 860 military personnel by concentrating it
in fewer areas and making it more mobile.  Security Council Resolution 1568, October 22,
2004, endorsed the Report.  Since 1993, costs not covered by contributions have been treated
as U.N. expenses. UNFICYP was to cost about $51.9 million for the period from July 2004
through June 2005.  Downsizing of the Force has not resulted in savings due to offsetting
increased expenditures. In FY2005, the United States contributed $5,694,000. The
Administration has requested $4,739,000 for FY2006.  Savings from the proposed personnel
cut have yet to be calculated, but are estimated at $9 million.  The government of Cyprus
contributes one-third of the cost and the government of Greece contributes $6.5 million




Since 1974, the United States has supported U.N. negotiations to achieve a settlement.
There were sharp divisions between the Ford and Carter Administrations and Congress over
Turkey’s role on Cyprus from 1974-1978.  A congressionally mandated arms embargo
against Turkey was in place until September 1978.  In general, Congress favored measures
to pressure Turkey to withdraw its troops and encourage concessions by Denktash, while
successive administrations argued that pressures were counterproductive and preferred
diplomacy.  Although Members did not propose an alternative to the U.N. talks, they sought
an active U.S. role.  In response, President Reagan created the State Department post of
Special Cyprus Coordinator, and President Clinton named a Presidential Envoy for Cyprus.
The current Bush Administration did not name a Presidential Envoy, and since June 2004,
the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs has been performing the
job of Special Cyprus Coordinator without taking on the title.
On February 14, 2001, Secretary of State Powell affirmed that the Administration “fully
supports the ongoing U.N. efforts.”   The Administration championed the Annan settlement
Plan. Special Cyprus Coordinator Thomas Weston openly aided the Turkish Cypriot political
opposition before the December 2003 parliamentary elections to increase the chances of a
settlement. (See Domestic Politics in Cyprus, above, for election outcome.)  Secretary Powell
urged all parties to show flexibility, reach an agreement on the Annan Plan, and then to vote
“yes” in the April 24, 2004 referenda.  At a donors’ conference on April 15, the United States
pledged $400 million over four years if the Annan Plan were approved in the referenda, of
which $100 million would be available for “immediate needs” and the rest in future years.
After the referenda, the State Department accused Greek Cypriot leaders of
manipulating public opinion by restricting news media and taking other steps to ensure a
“no” vote.  Weston said that the Department was seeking ways to end the isolation of
northern Cyprus and to improve its economy in moves parallel to those of the EU and the
U.N.  He said that if the Turkish Cypriots were able to move toward economic equality with
the Greek Cypriots, then some Greek Cypriot concerns about the cost of a settlement might
be removed.  Powell met Prime Minister Talat in New York on May 4 and referred to him
by his title.  U.S. Ambassador to Cyprus Michael Klosson visited Talat in the Prime
Minister’s Office on May 21. The State Department issued a written statement that the
Secretary and Ambassador had met Talat as “leader of the Turkish Cypriot community....”
On May 28, the U.S. Embassy on Cyprus said that TRNC passport holders seeking to travel
to the United States would be eligible for consideration for a visa for up to two years.  In
June, the Administration authorized U.S. government and military personnel to travel
directly to northern Cyprus. Also in June, Weston visited the TRNC’s representatives in New
York and Washington in their offices.  On September 25, Under Secretary of State Marc
Grossman met President Papadopoulos on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly
opening in New York.  On October 13, Ambassador Klosson said, “We are prepared to assist
settlement efforts, but proposals on next steps must come from Nicosia, not foreign capitals.”
Also in October, members of the U.S. Transport Security Service examined an airport
in northern Cyprus in the context of helping to curtail the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots.
On February 17, 2005, representatives from 12 U.S. companies and the commercial attache
from the U.S. Embassy in Ankara landed at Ercan Airport in northern Cyprus to advise
Turkish Cypriot counterparts.  The State Department again said that the purpose of the visit
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was to ease the economic isolation of the Turkish Cypriots.  The Republic of Cyprus has not
designated ports or airports in the north as legal ports of entry. So Greek Cypriot officials
charged that the delegation’s, especially the U.S. diplomat’s, use of the airport was illegal.
  
From 1978-2003, Congress appropriated $14 million or $15 million for scholarships,
bicommunal projects, and measures aimed at reunifying the island, reducing tensions, and
promoting peace and cooperation between the two communities. The Administration
requested $13.5 million in aid for FY2005.  It was appropriated in P.L. 108-447, signed on
December 8, 2004.  On July 9, the State Department announced that $30.5 million would be
provided for economic development of northern Cyprus to lessen the cost of reunification
by supporting small and medium enterprises and continuing bicommunal activities.  The
Administration has requested $20 million for FY2006 to “support the peace process and
eventual reunification of the island by increasing bicommunal efforts to build support for a
solution....  The funding will also continue to support activities to strengthen the Turkish
Cypriot economy and economic integration of the island.” 
In September 2004, the State Department notified Congress that Greece had transferred
U.S. defense articles to Cyprus in violation of Arms Export Control Act restrictions on arms
transfers to third parties.  The arms are used by the Cypriot National Guard commanded by
Greek officers seconded to Cyprus.  No further U.S. action was taken or expected.  ( For
background, see CRS Report RL30982, U.S. Defense Articles and Services Supplied to
Foreign Recipients: Restrictions on their Use, May 30, 2001, by Richard F. Grimmett.)
 
